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Rebellion of Cao Qin
The Rebellion of Cao Qin () was a day-long uprising in the Ming Dynasty capital of Beijing on August7, 1461, staged by Chinese general Cao Qin (; d. 1461) and his Ming troops of Mongol and Han descent against the Tianshun Emperor (1457–1464). The rebellion was orchestrated by Cao and his officers due to fear of being next on Tianshun's purge-list of those who helped him gain back the throne from his half-brother the Jingtai Emperor, who had earlier succeeded during the 1449 Tumu Crisis.〔Robinson (1999), 84–85.〕 The leaked plot of rebellion was a failure, three of Cao's brothers were killed during the ensuing battle, and Cao Qin was forced to commit suicide during the effort of a last stand against imperial troops storming his Beijing residential compound. The rebellion marked the high point in political tension over allowing Mongols to be employed in the Ming military command structure. Ming Chinese officials often made recompense with Mongol subordinates for military merits while at the same time strategically relocating their troops and families away from the capital.
==Background==
During the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), the Mongols enrolled in military service were either originally prisoners of war or they were those who voluntarily submitted to the Ming and settled in China.〔Serruys (1959), 209.〕 Others fled their homeland on the northern steppe due to natural disasters such as droughts, seeking refuge in China where Mongol families found lodging and hospitality.〔Robinson (1999), 95.〕 Some Mongols became distinguished military officers, were granted noble ranks, and on rarer occasions became ministers in the state bureaucracy.〔 Mongols of noble lineage socialized with Chinese literati of the two capitals (Nanjing and Beijing) while they also had their sons educated in the Chinese classic texts.〔Robinson (1999), 117.〕 Nonetheless, Mongols in the Ming Empire were often held in suspicion by Chinese Ming authorities. Mongols of lower social stature were often accused by Chinese officials of being prone to violence, banditry, and becoming beggars and even prostitutes.〔 Ming officials used the excuse of military campaigns to relocate and scatter Mongol troops and families throughout China so that they would not be concentrated in North China (which neighbored the enemy territory of the Mongol heartland).〔Robinson (1999), 84–96.〕 Wu Tingyun argues that there was a noticeable shift in Ming court policies after the 1449 Tumu Crisis in dealing with the Mongols; he stated that beforehand the Ming court actively encouraged Mongol immigration, and afterwards merely managed those who had already sided with the Ming.〔Robinson (1999), 85.〕〔Wu, 106–111.〕
On July 20, 1461, after Mongols had staged raids in June into Ming territory along the northern tracts of the Yellow River, the Minister of War Ma Ang (马昂; 1399–1476) and General Sun Tang (孙镗; d. 1471) were appointed to lead a force of 15,000 troops to bolster the defenses of Shaanxi.〔Robinson (1999), 95–96.〕 Historian David M. Robinson states that "these developments must also have fed suspicion about Mongols living in North China, which in turn exacerbated Mongol feelings of insecurity. However, no direct link can be found between the decision by the Ming Mongols in Beijing to join the () coup and activities of steppe Mongols in the northwest."〔Robinson (1999), 96.〕
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